To undercut this general option, van Fraassen argues, the realist must commit to some claim like: every regularity and coincidence must be explained. Existence, reference, and truth are all theory-relative. Virtually all T-T* transitions in the past were affected by PUA: the earlier T-theorists selected T as the best supported theory of the available alternatives; they did not conceive of T* as an alternative; T* was conceived only later yet T* is typically better supported than T. At any given time, we could only conceive a limited set of hypotheses that were confirmed by all the evidence then available, yet subsequent inquiry revealed distinct alternatives that turned out to be equally or better confirmed by that evidence. Second, truth and reference are disquotational devices: because of the T-equivalences, to assert that “snow is white” is true (in English) is just to assert that snow is white; similarly, to assert that “snow” refers (in English) to some stuff is just to assert that the stuff is snow. For example, that Venus has CO2 in its atmosphere is currently warrantedly assertible, but future investigation could lead us to discover that it is not true. Tarski showed how to define the concept is true-in-L (where L is a placeholder for some particular language). Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. 0. Realists must be careful not to interpret history of science blindly (ignoring the successes of ether theories and the failures of early atomic theories, for example) or Whiggishly (begging questions by wrongly attributing to our predecessors our referential intentions—by assuming, for example, that Newton’s “gravity” referred to properties of the space-time metric). Worrall, J. Such theorems suggest that Newtonian mechanics yields close to correct answers for applications close to the relativistic limits (not too fast). More generally, Quine argued, once the explicit definitional route failed by Carnap’s allowing the meaning of “electron” to be a function of the totality of its logical connections within a theory, Carnap had already adopted meaning holism, according to which one cannot separate the analytic sentences, whose truth-values are determined by the contribution of language, from the synthetic sentences, whose truth-values are determined by the contribution of fact. Critics argue that there is no sharp, epistemologically significant distinction between form (structure) and content (nature) of the kind needed for EStR. To accept a theory is to believe it is (approximately) true. Bellarmine advocated an antirealist interpretation of Copernicus’s heliocentrism—as a useful instrument that saved the phenomena—whereas Galileo advocated a realist interpretation—the planets really do orbit the sun. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Because of their externalist semantics, they are committed to theses about reference: theoretical terms genuinely refer, reference is trans-theoretic, and reference is preserved in T-T* transitions (so that “electron” in Bohr’s earlier and later theories refers to the same object and the later theory provides a more adequate conception of that object). On classical accounts, a speaker S correctly uses a term “t” to refer to an object x only if x uniquely satisfies a concept, description, verification procedure, or theory that S associates with “t”. The realist answer is: “because a partially correct account of a theoretical object (as the gravitational field) must be replaced by a better account of the same theory-independent object (as the metric structure of spacetime)”. This week we will again debate a controversial issue together in class. In §5e we distinguished ground-level and meta-level uses of IBE and suggested that this strategy might be more promising for the latter than the former. Stanford, P. K. (2001), “Refusing the Devil’s Bargain: What Kind of Underdetermination Should We Take Seriously?”, Philosophy of Science 68 (3), S1-S12. In {Newton’s theory of gravitation + there is no transneptunian planet}, “gravitation” has one meaning; in {Newton’s theory of gravitation + there are transneptunian planets}, it has another meaning. The term passes through the community so that reference is preserved. Indeed, if all content must be traced to the senses, how can we even understand such theories? Depending on the kind of idealism adopted “p is true” might be rendered “p is warrantedly assertible”, “p is derivable from theory Θ”, or “p is accepted in paradigm P”, all of the form “p is E” where E is some epistemic surrogate for “true”. Mature theories (with the credentials to warrant optimistic induction) must have passed a “take-off” point: there must be background beliefs that indicate their application boundaries and guide their theoretical development; their successes must be supported by converging but independent lines of inquiry and so forth. StR, they argue, provides the best of both worlds by acknowledging and reconciling the pull of both pessimistic and optimistic inductions on the history of science. Third, the “able” in “observable” cannot be specified in a way that motivates a plausible distinction. It is often characterized in terms of these commitments: The debate begins with modern science. Because truth is defined in terms of reference (for example, “a is F” is true if and only if the referent of “a” has the property expressed by “F”), truth on Putnam’s account is also a causal notion. [clarification needed]Within philosophy of science, this view is often an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained? Some of the major arguments on both sides of this debate are evaluated in this chapter, though special attention is paid to the so-called “miracle argument” for scientific realism. First, they must answer the undermining challenge (above) in a way that is not ad hoc, question-begging, or transparently Whiggish. Past theories that were on the right track were so because they mathematically coded in systematic ways the detection properties (as opposed to the idle auxiliary properties). The progress of science asymptotically converges on a true account. Then A’ is an empirical substructure of A, the result of restricting the original domain to observables and its properties and relations accordingly. Its proponents argue that it can account, for example, for apparently indistinguishable particles in entangled quantum states. I criticize eight antirealist proposals that I found in the literature with a view to proving that the realist proposal is still the best of the proposals I know of. Semantic deflationists (Fine 1996; Horwich 1990; Leeds 1995, 2007) argue that Tarski’s theory provides a complete account of truth and reference: truth and reference are not causal explanatory notions; they are merely disquotational devices that are uninformative though expressively indispensable—useful predicates that enable us to express certain claims (like “Everything Putnam said is true”) that would be otherwise inexpressible. Third, CE’s epistemic policy is pragmatically self-defeating or incoherent. (Two things about PUA are worth noting. On Putnam’s account, S correctly uses t to refer to x only if S is a member of a linguistic community whose t-usage (via their linguistic and extra-linguistic interactions) is causally or historically tied to the things or stuff that are of the same kind as x. T is empirically adequate if and only if T has an empirical substructure that all observables fit in. In rejecting conventionalism, Duhem and Quine claim that we may keep H and reject one of the Ais to accommodate not-O: any statement may be held true in light of disconfirming experience. 2 This widely held impression is confirmed by the recent increase in the number of publications dealing with structural realism. Duhem, P. (1991/1954/1906), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. For example, Jupiter’s moons are observable because a human could travel close enough to see them unaided, but electrons are unobservable because a human could never see one (that is just the nature of humans and electrons). However, Quine rejected their theory of meaning and its central analytic-synthetic distinction, arguing that theoretical content cannot be analytically welded to observational content. Instead, for example, the 180º measurement could also be accommodated by presupposing that light rays traverse shortest paths in spherical space but are disturbed by a force, so that physical space is “really” non-Euclidean: the true angle-sum of the triangle is greater than 180º, but the disturbing force makes it “appear” that space is Euclidean and the angle-sum of the triangle is 180º. Conventionalism is not an “anything-goes” doctrine—not all stipulations will accommodate the evidence—it is the claim that the physical meaning of measurements and evidence is determined by conventionally adopted frameworks. Third is IBE: the success of DN-explanations in rendering large classes of phenomena intelligible can justify our inferring the truth of the covering laws. Realistic semantics ties correct usage to things in the world using causal relations. (1989), “Noa’s Ark–Fine for Realism”, Philosophical Quarterly 39, 383–398. Putnam develops a causal-historical account of reference for natural kind terms (“water”) and physical magnitude terms (“temperature”). P Wiener, intro. 3) Underdetermination argument: Supports anti-realism. In physics, we explain by combining the forces: the actual force acting on a charged massive body is FA = FG + FC, the vector-sum of the Newton and Coulomb forces, which determines the actual acceleration and path. Proponents believe that science is full of theories that are proved incorrect, and that the majority of theories ultimately are rejected or refined. This is all very hypothetical, but if we somehow knew that scientific realism was correct, then it would give us more faith in our scientific theories describing reality and we'd be more committed to them. We can similarly consider the offices of the U.S. President, Vice-President, Speaker of the House, and so forth. Logical positivism began in Vienna and Berlin in the 1910s and 1920s and migrated to America after 1933, when many of its proponents fled Nazism. As a result, during the transition, scientists have to learn a new way of seeing and understanding phenomena—Kuhn likens the experience to a “gestalt switch” or “religious conversion”. Following Duhem (1991) Stanford poses what he calls the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA): for any fundamental domain of inquiry at any given time t there are alternative scientific hypotheses not entertained at t but which are consistent with (and even equally confirmed by) all the actual evidence available at t. PUA, were it true, would seem to create a serious underdetermination problem for SR: we opt for our current best confirmed theory, but there is a distinct alternative that is equally supported by all the evidence we possess, but which we currently lack the imagination to think of. Take “electron” in Thomson’s 1898 theory, in Bohr’s 1911 theory, and in full quantum theory (late 1920s). The practice of physicists, she argues, indicates that we ought to be antirealists about fundamental laws and points instead to a messy, untidy universe that physicists cope with by constructing unified abstract stories (Cartwright 1999). Poincaré proposed conventionalism: we decide conventionally that geometry is Euclidean, forces are Newtonian, light travels in Euclidean straight lines, and we see if experimental results will fit those conventions. IBE is the rule that we should infer the truth of the theory (if there is one) that best explains the phenomena. NOA takes science on its own terms, a practice whose history and methods are rooted in, and are extensions of, everyday thinking (Miller 1987). Musgrave, A. To know the meaning of a directly interpretable O-term is to associate it with a concept (verification condition) which determines the term’s extension. (1989), “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”, Dialectica 43, 99–124. Scientific realism is the view that the universe described by science is real regardless of how it may be interpreted. Psillos, S. (2001), “Is Structural Realism Possible?”, Philosophy of Science 68, S13–S24. Stanford, P.K. Kuhn, T.S. In each case there is a gap between our evidence (what has been observed) and what science arrives at (claims about all observables (CE) or claims about all observables and unobservables (SR)). Moreover, Cartwright arguably conflates different kinds of laws: in classical settings, the fundamental laws are Newton’s laws of motion, and his F = ma is the super-law that combines Newton’s gravitational and Coulomb’s electrostatic laws (Wilson 1998). In turn, to know the meaning of an indirectly interpretable T-term is to know its logical connections to directly interpretable terms. But sooner or later anomalies crop up that the paradigm cannot handle (for example, the failure to bring electromagnetism, black body radiation, and Mercury’s orbit under the Newtonian scheme). Finally, critics object to structuralists’ interpretations of the history. In analytic philosophy, anti-realism is an epistemological position first articulated by British philosopher Michael Dummett which encompasses many varieties such as metaphysical, mathematical, semantic, scientific, moral and epistemic. P. Pragmatists also tend to supplement Tarski’s understanding of truth, like philosophers in a broadly idealist tradition (including Hume, Kant, the positivists, and Kuhn) who employ truth-surrogates that structure the “world” side of the correspondence relation in some way (impressions, sense data, phenomena, a structured given) that would render the correspondence intelligible. Liston, M. (2005), “Does ‘Rabbit’ refer to Rabbits?”, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1, 39-56. Then any sentence S will be true* (of W) if and only if S is true-in-M. Finally, if we interpret the language of science literally (as van Fraassen does), then we ought to accept that we see tables if and only if we see collections of molecules subject to various kinds of forces. For this to be a concrete (physical) fact, God would have had to create some objects—nucleons with symmetrically related isospin states or some more fundamental objects that compose nucleons—to occupy the neutron- and proton-nodes of the SU(2) group-structure. In his SR period, Putnam held that only real word-world correspondences could capture the epistemic transcendence and causal explanatory features of truth. Poincaré, for example, held that, because of its simplicity, we would never give up Euclidean geometry. In order to give Premise 1 bite, the theories must have empirical consequences, which they will have only with the help of auxiliary hypotheses, A (§4). 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